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Abstract: 
International cooperation on outer space security has fluctuated over the past decades, 
marked by periods of common endeavor and relative stability as well as times of 
destabilizing developments and rising tensions. The UN Group of Governmental Experts’ 
2013 consensus report on Transparency and Confidence Building Measures, with its rich 
menu of measures and promised new levels of cooperative security conduct by states, 
was a diplomatic high-water mark. Regrettably, subsequent negative developments 
threaten to reverse the cooperative trend the report espoused. These developments include 
the introduction (by Russia and China) and rejection (by the US) of a revised draft treaty 
on the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT); the adoption by the 
UN General Assembly of a divisive resolution on “No First Placement” of space 
weapons; the failure of the EU to gain support for its proposed Code of Conduct; and 
escalating strategic tensions. This paper analyzes the reemergence of these “dark forces” 
as to their implication for multilateral diplomacy and suggests several remedial actions to 
preserve space security.  
Note: The final, definitive version of this paper has been published in Nonproliferation 
Review 23(3-4), June-July 2016. DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2016.1268750. 
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Dark Forces Awaken: The Prospects for Cooperative Space Security 
 
The former British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan was once questioned by a 
journalist as to what matters kept him up at nights. He is reported to have replied “Events, my 
dear boy, events”. What is true for politics is also valid for diplomacy. External events often 
have the unsettling effect of imposing themselves on the carefully developed plans and 
timetables of diplomatic practitioners and disrupting their content. It is also a truism that no 
diplomacy occurs in a vacuum, it will always be affected by the general political environment in 
which it operates. At the same time it is the diplomat’s task to attempt to make progress towards 
established goals despite the vagaries of the international environment. 
This paper takes as its starting point one of the most positive developments in recent 
years in the realm of outer space security diplomacy and contrasts this with a set of subsequent 
negative trends that threaten to eclipse it. The positive development was the consensus report of 
the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on “Transparency and Confidence-building 
Measures in Outer Space Activities” of July 2013.1 This major report emerged despite a 
protracted impasse in consideration of outer space security issues in the responsible diplomatic 
forums. The “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space” (PAROS) has been a standing item 
on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament since 1982. The Conference, a 65 member 
state body in Geneva, is supposed to serve as the UN’s chief forum for the negotiation of 
multilateral agreements on arms control and disarmament. While the “Prevention of an Arms 
Race in Outer Space” item has remained on the Conference’s formal agenda an Ad Hoc 
Committee mandated to consider this subject only operated between 1985 and 1994. Since then 
and due to the overall deadlock regarding competing priorities that has paralyzed the Conference 
and prevented it from officially working on this or any other item on its agenda, the outer space 
security issue has been sidelined at the UN. Although outer space has been the subject of annual 
declaratory resolutions in the First (Disarmament and International Security) Committee of the 
UN General Assembly and half a day of thematic debate during these sessions, the fact remains 
that no significant action has been undertaken multilaterally specifically on the space security 
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theme for decades. There have been some positive developments in the context of the UN’s 
Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space (COPUOUS) most notably in 2007 with adoption 
of Debris Mitigation Guidelines as well as more recently agreement on several policy guidelines 
developed by the working group on the Long Term Sustainability of Outer Space, but these lack 
an explicit space security orientation.  
Against this backdrop of stagnant multilateral consideration of space security, the ability 
of the UN GGE, after three one-week sessions under the able chairmanship of Victor Vasiliev of 
Russia, to agree a consensus report was welcomed as both a substantive and a diplomatic 
success.  
Substantive in that it provided a cogent account of the purpose of transparency and 
confidence building measures (henceforth TCBMs) in promoting international cooperation and 
outer space security. The report also enumerated the chief categories of TCBMs and importantly 
set out criteria for developing these measures. It then proceeded to present an extensive menu of 
potential TCBMs and encouraged states to consider adopting such measures on a voluntary basis. 
At the same time, the GGE noted that TCBMs could complement, but not substitute for arms 
limitation and disarmament measures and the means to verify such measures.  
Diplomatically, the GGE represented a success in demarcating with considerable detail, 
common ground for the international community in advancing shared objectives for sustaining a 
secure environment in outer space. This accomplishment was particularly timely in that it 
appeared to offer a cooperative path forward for states on the outer space file against a 
background of revived fears over the re-emergence of anti-satellite weapon testing by major 
spacefaring states a few years earlier. Indeed the GGE acknowledged that contemporary and 
future fears constituted a motivation for its work: “In the context of international peace and 
security, there is growing concern that threats to vital space capabilities may increase during the 
next decade as a result of both natural and man-made hazards and the possible development of 
disruptive and destructive counterspace capabilities”.2  
These concerns proved to be well founded and not long after the issuance of the GGE 
report “dark forces” emerged to overshadow the promise that the GGE had represented. When 
the rounds of applause over the GGE’s success had died down, the international community was 
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still left with the question whether its well-crafted TCBMs are likely to be implemented anytime 
soon. Regrettably, the impetus for cooperative security measures in space represented by the 
GGE seems to have met countervailing forces that have weakened its positive impact on the 
space policies of states. In my view, four main developments in the post-2013 period have 
worked against greater take up of the GGE recommendations: i) an impasse over legally-binding 
constraints such as the draft treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Space 
Treaty (PPWT); ii) the breakdown of consensual approach to space-related resolutions at UNGA; 
iii) escalating threat perceptions and accompanying rhetoric regarding counterforce capabilities 
and iv) the failure to realize an International Code of Conduct as had been promoted by the EU. I 
will consider each of these factors in turn while recognizing that there are clear interrelationships 
amongst them.  
Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space Treaty Impasse  
The protracted impasse with respect to consideration of the Sino-Russian proposed treaty 
on the “Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the threat or use of force 
against outer space objects” (PPWT) has represented a blockage in space security diplomacy that 
has had negative consequences all around. Not least of which is the impression that states are not 
willing to engage in considering and working through a draft text on a serious space security 
issue. The PPWT was formally tabled at the CD in 2008, although its antecedents at the CD date 
back to 2002 and even earlier in the UN General Assembly where a similar draft treaty was 
presented by the Soviet Union in 1983. After receiving some reactions from CD member states 
China and Russia submitted a revised version of the proposed treaty in June 2014.3 Its sponsors 
have repeatedly said that they would welcome further discussion of the draft, but given the lack 
of an agreed program of work at the CD and the concomitant absence of an Ad Hoc Committee 
on its PAROS agenda item, there has been no authorized subsidiary body at the CD to take up 
this proposal. China and Russia however have not been willing to take the draft treaty outside the 
CD for consideration and it remains in a form of suspended animation.  
Since the tabling of the revised version the principal official action undertaken at the CD 
has been a critical analysis of the PPWT submitted by the United States and a rebuttal of that 
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criticism offered by China and Russia. The US criticism mainly focuses on the lack of 
verification provisions in the PPWT and its inadequate scope given its failure to cover terrestrial 
anti-satellite weapons (ASATs). The rebuttal argues that it is not feasible to verify a wider 
weapons ban, but only a prohibition on placement and the use of force at this time although it 
envisages the possibility of elaborating verification measures in the future. With regard to 
terrestrial ASATs, the rebuttal asserts that the treaty’s ban on the use of force against space 
objects would preclude the use of such weapons and should therefore eliminate the incentive to 
develop and possess them. The Sino-Russian paper also hints at the major problem posed by 
missile defences with their inherent anti-satellite capability that would arise if an effort was made 
to cover terrestrial based ASATs in a treaty.   
To some extent the deadlock over the PPWT has also represented a proxy battle with 
respect to the acceptability of legally binding arms control accords in the current geopolitical 
environment. The US continues to claim that “it is not opposed to space arms control agreements 
in principle” but it appears to be so in practice, having made no proposal of its own or endorsed 
any other. In his statement to the 2015 UN General Assembly First Committee debate on outer 
space, US Ambassador Robert A. Wood said “In contrast to the approach advocated by some 
States to pursue protracted negotiations to conclude a legally binding instrument, the United 
States is convinced that many outer space challenges confronting us could be addressed through 
practical, near-term initiatives, such as non-legally binding TCBMs”.4 
China and Russia for their part in proposing the PPWT reflect their longstanding 
preference for legally binding instruments when addressing international security issues. At the 
same aforementioned First Committee session that Ambassador Wood addressed, the Chinese 
representative called for “more convergence and start multilateral negotiations on an arms 
control treaty so as to effectively maintain safety and security of space”. While recognizing the 
potential role of TCBMs as a complement to the non-weaponization of space, the Chinese 
delegate stressed that “given their intrinsic limitations, TCBM cannot replace the negotiation of a 
legally-binding arms control treaty”.5 The fact of these sharply opposing views on the contents of 
the PPWT and the absence of any working body for engaging the protagonists and other parties 
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in an effort to reconcile these views is a significant obstacle to progress on space security and the 
elaboration of new multilateral agreements.  
Breakdown of Consensus 
One of the positive features of the international community’s declaratory policy on outer 
space security, as evidenced by relevant resolutions at the UN General Assembly, has been the 
high degree of consensual approaches. The annual resolution on the Prevention of an Arms Race 
in Outer Space for example has had no opposing votes in recent years and only two abstentions. 
The resolution on TCBMs was adopted last UNGA session without a vote being required. At the 
69th session of UNGA in 2014 however this pattern of consensual policy expression was broken 
with the introduction by Russia of a new resolution on the “No First Placement of Weapons in 
Outer Space”. This resolution (69/32) encouraged states to adopt a political commitment not to 
be the first to place weapons in outer space. There was significant resistance to this resolution 
with some arguing that it did not meet the criteria for TCBMs that had just been arrived at by the 
GGE. Others thought the “no first placement” phraseology as opposed to a simple “no 
placement” pledge to be problematic. In an Explanation of Vote on behalf of the EU it was stated 
that the resolution “could be interpreted as implicitly encouraging States to pre-emptively 
develop offensive space capabilities, in order to be able to react to the placement by another 
State of a weapon in space”.6 
Despite these misgivings the resolution sponsors did not offer up any modification to the 
text and pressed on to a vote with the predictably divisive results of 126 in favour, 4 opposed and 
46 abstaining.  
At the General Assembly’s 2015 session the same resolution (70/27) was again adopted 
with a sizeable minority of states not supporting it. Regrettably this has introduced a discordant 
element into the generally consensual approach that has characterized UNGA’s pronouncements 
on space security.  
The convening, at the same 70th session, of the first joint meeting of the First and Fourth 
Committees (the General Assembly Committees responsible for the international security and 
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peaceful use dimensions of outer space respectively) while symbolically desirable in bridging the 
institutional divide on space did not generate any practical outcome to help span the policy 
fissures revealed. In addressing the meeting, the chair of the GGE, Ambassador Victor Vasiliev 
acknowledged that his group had expressed doubts as to the follow-up that would be accorded to 
their report. He stated: “When our group was working on the recommendations we also had 
doubts whether the report would serve its purpose or would be just another file in the archive?”.7 
Ironically the origin of this first joint meeting lay in a recommendation from the report of the 
GGE, perhaps the only recommendation of the GGE actually implemented by UN member states 
to date.  
Some observers will point to the agreement this summer at COPUOUS to adopt 12 of 28 
proposed guidelines generated by the working group on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer 
Space as representing progress in implementing the GGE recommendations. The GGE was 
careful however not to conflate the guidelines being discussed in COPUOUS with the TCBMs it 
was espousing. The troubled history in achieving consensus on the initial set of guidelines and 
the fact that the working group’s timeline has been extended by two years for addressing the 
majority of guidelines that remain outstanding, suggests that even this more “technical” effort at 
consensus building on space policy remains problematic.  
It is noteworthy that the International Committee of the Red Cross, the guardian of 
international humanitarian law (IHL), saw fit to include for the first time a section on outer space 
in its statement to the 2015 session of the General Assembly’s First Committee. The statement 
affirms that “any hostile use of outer space in armed conflict…must comply with IHL” although 
“by asserting that IHL applies to outer space warfare, the ICRC is in no way condoning the 
weaponization of outer space, which recurring resolutions of the General Assembly have sought 
to prevent.”8 The ICRC’s decision to include the issue of outer space warfare in its statement 
suggests a heightened concern by that organization with respect to current trends in outer space 
security.  
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Escalating Threat Perceptions 
Another troubling theme in recent years has been the escalation of threat perceptions and 
allegedly of weapon development programs aimed at deploying counterspace capabilities. 
Indicative of this trend was the US Director of National Intelligence’s recent global threat 
assessment, which stated “Threats to our use of military, civil, and commercial space systems 
will increase in the next few years as Russia and China progress in developing counterspace 
weapon systems to deny, degrade, or disrupt US space systems”.9 If this was not disturbing 
enough, under a “Destroy” sub-heading the DNI stated “Russia and China continue to pursue 
weapons systems capable of destroying satellites on orbit, placing US satellites at greater risk in 
the next few years”.10 In this context specific reference is made to China progressing on “the 
antisatellite missile system that it tested in July 2014”.11 
Chinese activity including a May 2013 “scientific mission” launch that almost reached 
geo-stationary orbit range has contributed to what has been described as “quiet panic” within the 
US national space security community”. In particular the US intelligence community was 
alarmed over what it perceived as Chinese ASAT testing that would threaten the hitherto 
sanctuary of geo-stationary orbit where key intelligence satellites reside.12 
Whatever the reality of these military space programs, and generally this is an area of 
activity that could benefit from greater transparency, the ratcheting up of threat-rhetoric can fuel 
incipient arms racing to the detriment of outer space security. The depiction of an outer space 
situation where “Today our adversaries perceive that space is a weak-link in our deterrence 
calculus” and it is thus necessary “to disabuse our adversaries of the idea that our space 
capabilities make tempting targets” can be seen as provocative and projecting an offensive intent 
on other spacefaring states.13 Official depictions of the space security situation in this negative 
light can prompt demands for building up counterspace capabilities of one’s own.14 Such 
heightened threat perceptions and the expanded programs to counter these threats can detract 
from or even displace diplomatic efforts to foster international space cooperation. They can also 
be readily seized upon by other states to justify military buildups of their own and perpetuate a 
classic “security dilemma” situation in a strategically vital environment.  
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Failure of International Code of Conduct Proposal 
Many observers of outer space diplomacy had high hopes regarding the EU-initiated 
proposal for an International Code of Conduct (ICoC) to cover outer space activities.  
This set of measures, some re-packaged some newly minted, represented an effort (in the 
words of the preamble) “to safeguard the continued peaceful and sustainable use of outer space 
for current and future generations”.15  
The proposal was first put forward in 2008, motivated in part by a concern over the 
revival of ASAT activity in the preceding months and by the desire to display a tangible product 
of the Common European Security and Defence Policy. The process of consulting on and 
refining the text proved, however, to be a lengthy and uneven one. Personnel changes in the 
Non-proliferation and Disarmament section of the European External Action Service also 
appeared to impede the diplomatic management of the initiative.  
The tempo and extent of consultations markedly increased in the 2013-2014 timeframe 
with expanded multilateral consultations held in Kiev in May 2013, in Bangkok in November 
2013 and in Luxembourg in May 2014. On the basis of these meetings the EU sponsors clearly 
felt that the ICoC was ready to move into a final round of multilateral negotiations prior to 
concluding the text. The meeting the EU convened in New York, July 27-31, 2015, to this end 
failed however to produce the desired outcome. Significantly, it revealed a major disagreement 
amongst participants as to the basic process and auspices appropriate to this enterprise. In 
particular, dissent came from the BRICS grouping of states (Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa) which issued a joint statement stipulating that “the elaboration of such an 
instrument should be held in the format of inclusive and consensus-based multilateral 
negotiations within the framework of the UN, based on a proper and unequivocal mandate, 
without specific deadlines and taking into account the interests of all States”.16 
The EU voiced its disappointment that negotiations to finalize the text of the ICoC had 
proven impossible after so much preparation. Tellingly however the EU did not decide to try and 
seek a new UN-mandate for an open-ended negotiation process at the fall 2015 session of the UN 
General Assembly, even though the Chair’s Summary of the July meeting suggested that course 
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of action. In his remarks to the First Committee during its thematic debate on outer space in 
October, 2015 at the 70th UNGA session, Jacek Bylica, the EU’s Special Envoy for Non-
proliferation and Disarmament suggested that the EU had done its bit and was now seeking 
support from others in deciding the fate of the ICoC proposal. He stated: “We regret that 
negotiations could not commence after so many years of consultations, but we are confident that 
the rich and substantial discussions in New York both on the substance and on the process will 
help the international community to move forward”.17 
The United States, a persistent if tepid backer of the EU ICoC initiative seems to hold out 
some hope that the project will be taken up again by the EU. A senior State Department official 
with responsibility for the space file indicated that: “We understand that the European Union 
continues to discuss next steps on the Code. The international community is certainly in 
agreement that the space environment is at risk today from challenges arising from natural and 
man-made hazards”.18 Despite this expression of faith in EU leadership and the need to respond 
to space security threats, the path ahead for ICoC looks murky. While there are non-
governmental voices within the EU calling for member states “to keep the ICoC on the table and 
under discussion at the UNGA” it is unclear whether the EU will continue to lead on the 
initiative. 19At present an external observer might describe the ICoC as being in a state of 
diplomatic limbo with no official champion committing to take the proposal forward. From a 
practical perspective the failure of the July 2015 meeting has had the effect of tossing cold water 
on what had appeared to be a promising diplomatic initiative on behalf of sustainability and 
security in outer space. 
What Now? 
I do not want to conclude this essay on a pessimistic note, but realism dictates that 
stakeholders in the secure use of outer space take cognizance of the negative trends of recent 
years and formulate strategies in that light. Remedial action to promote cooperative security 
approaches in outer space is needed and stakeholders in the private sector and civil society 
should not be passive bystanders to these events, but advocates for responsible state conduct. In 
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my opinion, there are four near term steps that could be taken that would help restore a more 
positive atmosphere for outer space security diplomacy.  
New legal instruments for space arms control: 
China and Russia, as the chief sponsors, should move beyond the moribund Conference 
on Disarmament and seek another forum to initiate discussion of their proposed PPWT and 
legally-binding arms control in space generally. This could be arranged through either an 
existing or an ad hoc mechanism, but it would permit discussion of the important factors of 
definitions, scope and verification that have not to date had an adequate airing in a multilateral 
context. To maximize participation such an examination should be constituted as a generic 
discussion of the issues raised by any new international legal instrument for space arms control, 
although the PPWT could feature as a leading example of such a treaty. While it would be 
desirable that such a meeting should be held in a diplomatic context it could also benefit from the 
participation of civil society/academic experts.  
Exercise strategic restraint: 
States should practice strategic restraint in their military space programs, offer greater 
transparency as to their nature and generally “cool” the threat rhetoric in their public utterances. 
There should be a conscious decision by leading space powers to engage in de-escalatory 
commentary on space developments and highlight areas for international cooperation. Some 
well-publicized exercises in transparency would be advisable. Invitations to observe launches 
and/or visit relevant facilities pursuant to the letter and the spirit of the Outer Space Treaty would 
help reduce misperceptions and boost confidence in the possibility of sustaining a peaceful space 
environment. The scientific, private sector and civil society could all play constructive roles 
alongside governments in renewing a cooperative ethos for outer space activity.  
It would also be constructive if there were other specific space security proposals on the 
multilateral table for consideration. Whether in the form of a political TCBM or as a legal 
instrument, a moratorium or ban on destructive ASAT testing would for example represent a 
positive input to the current debate if a state or states could champion it.  
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Take forward the International Code of Conduct proposal:  
After eight years of effort, it would be a shame if the ICoC idea disappeared from the 
diplomatic arena. Like any proposal there were undoubtedly elements of the draft text that could 
be improved upon. It represented however a promising set of TCBMs in line with the 
recommendations of the 2013 GGE. Especially innovative was the ICoC’s provision for 
institutional support. The type of regular meetings of subscribing states, of structured 
information exchange and a form of secretariat envisaged in the ICoC are all elements that have 
been sorely lacking under the existing multilateral regime for outer space. A representative group 
of states should initiate a process soon at the UN General Assembly, to establish an open-ended 
working group to elaborate an International Code of Conduct on outer space activities. EU states 
could be part of such an effort, but it would be desirable for them to include interested states 
from other regional groupings to optimize support for the undertaking. Putting a renewed 
negotiation firmly under UN auspices would remove the grounds for the opposition of the NAM 
and BRICS groupings to the previous process and ensure that any ICoC emerging from such a 
negotiation would have the appropriate standing in the international community.  
Re-establish common ground and celebrate our success: 
A conscious effort should be pursued to re-establish common ground amongst all states 
concerning the global regime governing outer space. The vision of outer space as “the province 
of all mankind” the use of which should be “for peaceful purposes” and “shall be carried out for 
the benefit and in the interests of all countries” needs to be reaffirmed in the face of the “dark 
forces” that are currently gathering. Readers will probably recognize in the above citations some 
of the key tenets of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. This major treaty, which accorded outer 
space, the special status of a ‘global commons’ beyond any national appropriation still provides 
the foundation of the politico-legal regime for outer space. States should re-dedicate themselves 
to carrying out the purposes and provisions of the Outer Space Treaty.  
Next year affords an important opportunity for the international community to undertake 
such a re-dedication. In October 2017, the Outer Space Treaty’s 50th anniversary will occur. It 
would be fitting to convene the first ever meeting of its states parties. As an early post World 
War II international agreement, the Outer Space Treaty did not contain provision for any meeting 
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of its states parties: a norm of contemporary multilateral accords. Accordingly its 104 states 
parties have never officially met. To arrange for this meeting would be more than an appropriate 
celebration of a landmark treaty in the development of peaceful international cooperation. Such a 
gathering could help consolidate support for the vital obligations enshrined in the Outer Space 
Treaty and provide an occasion to consider how the cooperative regime it sets out can be 
consolidated and reinforced in the future. In the lead-up to a 50th anniversary commemorative 
meeting a new push towards universalization of the treaty could also be launched to further 
enhance its authority within the international community.  
Conclusion 
The 2013 UN GGE report on TCBMs represented a high-water mark of sorts in terms of 
multilateral cooperation on outer space security and sustainability. Its substantial menu of 
proposed measures, however, has not been drawn upon by states in adopting TCBMs. The period 
subsequent to the GGE report’s release has been marked by several negative developments that 
have had the effect of impeding rather than facilitating international cooperation on outer space 
security. It is time for concerned states and engaged stakeholders to undertake remedial action if 
the Outer Space Treaty’s vision of a peaceful outer space used for the benefit of all is to be 
preserved.  
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